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ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT DID NOT INVITE THE ERROR COMPLAINED OF IN 
THIS APPEAL AND THE INSUFFICIENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
REGARDING WITNESS TAMPERING RESULTED IN MANIFEST 
INJUSTICE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
The State attempts to color Appellant's attempts to request a review of the jury 
instructions as "fatally flawed" because the Appellant "actually proposed an elements 
instruction containing the very omission he now complains of on appeal." Br. Appellee at 11. 
Appellant concedes State v. Perdue and its progeny clearly stand for the proposition that 
"where invited error buts up against manifest injustice, the invited error rule prevails." 813 
P.2d 1202, 1206 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). However, the situation at issue here, and the position 
of the Appellant, deals not simply with the instructions provided, but rather, with the exclusion 
of additional instructions, which are critical to the determination of the jury as to the 
culpability of the Appellant. By framing the critical issue as an invited error situation, the 
State attempts to paint Appellant into a corner, such that under no circumstances could a set of 
jury instructions be considered on appeal if they were not first objected to at trial. This is 
clearly not what the legislature had in mind when it fashioned the language of Utah R. Crim. 
P. 19(c). While the State has cited a line of cases that seems to stand for the position that 
failure to object to a particular jury instruction seemingly forecloses any possibility of judicial 
review, such a legal anomaly cannot stand in light of the plain statutory language of Rule 
19(c). What the State has failed to recognize and respond to, however, is the actual issue 
under review here—not that the instruction given with regard to witness tampering failed to 
accurately reflect the language of the law, but rather that the failure of the court to provide 
additional information with regard to the mens rea required to convict appellant of the crime of 
witness tampering was lacking, rendering the jury instructions, as a whole, inadequate and 
resulting in manifest injustice. Consequently, it cannot be said that Appellant invited the error 
just because the instruction he proposed recited correct statutory language. Thus, the failure of 
trial counsel to object to the lack of a mens rea instruction, while bolstering Appellant's claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, does not serve to deny Appellant of the protections of a 
manifest error review under the trump of the invited error rule. 
The State concedes that the jury was not instructed on the mental state required to 
convict appellant of attempting to induce a person to perform any of the enumerated acts under 
the statute. Br. Appellee at 10. This, in fact, is the crux of Appellant's claim of manifest 
injustice regarding the court's instruction as to the elements of witness tampering. The failure 
of trial counsel to offer a mens rea instruction does not change the fact that the instructions 
given to the jury failed to instruct as to the mens rea requirement of attempting to induce 
Airman Lyon to perform any of the enumerated acts. Likewise, the State concedes, "to avoid 
manifest injustice, an elements instruction that fails to include the mens rea constitutes 
reversible error." Br. Appellee at 11 (quoting State v. Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, f 54, 989 
P.2d 1091). The language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508, witness tampering, does not contain 
a mens rea requirement with regard to attempting to induce the enumerated acts, triggering, as 
the State further concedes, the application of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102, which provides in 
pertinent part, "when the definition of the offense does not specify a culpable mental state and 
the offense does not involve strict liability, intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to 
establish criminal responsibility. However, nowhere in the jury instructions is this statute cited 
or referred to in any way. While Utah courts have generally recognized a knowledge or intent 
requirement with regard to the appropriate mental state in terms of attempting to induce the 
em lmerated acts, the jury instructions at issue are silent to any mens rea reqi lirement S ?e 
v w n ^ v_t. App. 1989). Thus , the members of the jury were left \* \\ .ut guidance a-, u Le 
impropriate mens rea, and were free to apply whatever degree oi v - , . r ^ i , i v ..A . .-. 
is* - ^elieence. This failure to properly instruct the 
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manifest injustice Review of such error is not precludes ; .. , - . . :--.. 
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H A R M L E S S A N D C O N S T I T U T E R E V E R S I B L E E R R O R . 
The State concedes that the trial :• :)i irt " 'ei red in insei ting tl le phrase 'oi can lsed to be 
made mtu instruction 3 0 . " Br. Appellee at 17. However , the State contends this error is 
"ha rmles s " because this court could determine from the record that the ju ry found all the 
elements oi the old use in" a1 ' ' -. " i". - null* h " d . • I1 • Slate K i^crcis. ' i 
lexicology fails to recognize that Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-504(2)(a) and (2)(c) are discreet 
offenses which require different levels of culpability and deal with dillerent actions As such, 
language "poses a problem only if it 
would have permitted the jury to convict based on conduci and a mental ^tate criminalized by 
neither 2(a) nor 2(c) secuun /O ,N ;>;-, i.iv correct anai\M. . * i. , . . ' ' *• e * > 
si,! i lih ,i as to ht • si it 'Si II i: led by ei t.el I other negating the need to determine if a conviciion undci 
one subsection would suffice to com ici under the othei The plain language of the statute 
makes it clear that this is not the case. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-504 (2)(a) deals solely with 
written false statements made by the defendant, while section 76-8-504 (2)(c) could be a 
writing written by anyone upon which the defendant invited reliance. Prior to addressing the 
critical difference between the two subsection, that being the different levels of culpability, it is 
important to note that truth and authenticity are not interchangeable terms in "common, daily, 
nontechnical speech." While the dictionary definitions of "true" and "authentic" are similar, 
in common parlance, and in terms of written documents, such terms are dissimilar. As used in 
the statute, making a written statement one does not believe to be true goes to the content of 
document. An authentic document, on the other hand, is a truthful document in the sense that 
the document is not a forgery, and it is true as to the representations made with regard to the 
origin of the document. Were there not this semantic difference between the two subsections, 
subsection 2(a) would be superfluous as its meaning would be entirely subsumed by the 
language of subsection 2(c). Thus, the addition of the phrase "or caused to be made" to the 
language of Instruction 30 2(a) fundamentally changes the nature of the violation charged such 
that the jury's determination is suspect. 
As noted above, however, the critical error in Instruction 30 is the failure to instruct the 
jury with regard to the varying degrees of culpability between the two subsections. To convict 
under subsection 2(a) the jury need to find only that the defendant believed the written 
statement to be untrue. On the other hand, to convict under subsection 2(c), the jury must find 
that the defendant knew the document to be lacking in authenticity. Once again, failure to 
instruct the jury as to all the elements of the crime, including the required mens rea, under 
each of these two discreet subsections constitutes manifest injustice and reversible error. See 
State v. Stringham, 957 P.2d 602, 608-09 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 
352, 354 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The State cites to State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042 (Utah 
1984) to support the position that failure to define the term knowingly was harmless error. 
However, the facts of Fontana are distinguishable and do not serve to support this position. In 
Fontana, the jury was instructed with regard to three alternate forms of conduct under which 
the defendant could be convicted of second-degree murder. 680 P.2d at 1044. The jury was 
then provided with detailed definitions of the meanings of these terms. Id. The defendant in 
Fontana took issue to the definition of the term "depraved indifference" as described in the 
definitions. Id. The Court held that although the definition of depraved indifference may have 
been incorrect, there was sufficient evidence to convict under one of the other forms of mens 
rea defined in the instructions. Id. at 1048. As a result the error was deemed harmless. Id. at 
1049. Conversely, the jury instructions at issue here contain no definition of knowingly or with 
knowledge and no explanation of the difference between knowing and believing. Thus, unlike 
the results in the Fontana case, it is impossible to determine upon what basis the jury was 
making a determination of guilt. It may be that the jury decided that Appellant caused to be 
made a false written statement that he believed was not true, under which case the jury's 
verdict was based on an incorrect definition of the law and manifest error results. Or it may be 
that the jury determined that Appellant invited reliance on a document which he knew to be 
lacking in authenticity, however, because the jury was not instructed with regard to the mens 
rea standard of knowingly or with knowledge, the instructions are fatally flawed. Regardless 
of the basis for the jury's decision, because of the errors in Instruction 30 this court cannot 
determine whether the jury found each required element and reversal is required. See State v. 
Laine, 618 P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 1980). In sum, Instruction 30 is inaccurate and over inclusive. 
The failure of the trial court to accurately instruct the jury as to the elements of the crime 
charged was not harmless, but rather, resulted in manifest injustice which denied Appellant his 
right to a fair trial. 
III. TRIAL COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE FELL BELOW AN OBJECTIVE 
STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS AND AS A RESULT THE 
OUTCOME OF THE TRIAL WAS PREJUDICED. 
As established through Appellant's Briefs, the deficient and inaccurate jury instructions 
resulted in manifest injustice and prejudice to Appellant. This prejudice to Appellant is 
directly attributable to trial counsel's failure to object to the proposed instructions or provide 
fully explanatory instructions with regard to mens rea requirements of the various charged 
offenses. Because the inaccurate and incomplete jury instructions resulted in manifest injustice 
to Appellant, trial counsel's failure to object satisfies the prejudice prong of the Strickland v. 
Washington test such that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 466 U.S. 668 
at 694 (1984). Strickland's prejudice prong is comparable to the standard used by Utah courts 
in determining the second prong of the manifest error test. See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 
124, n. 15 (Utah 1989). Therefore, because Appellant has established manifest injustice from 
the erroneous jury instructions, trial counsel's failure to object to or provide correct alternative 
instructions likewise resulted in sufficient prejudice to meet the second prong of the Strickland 
test. 
Regardless of the prejudice to Appellant, the State claims that the trial counsel's 
performance does not fall below the reasonable performance standards, as required by the first 
prong of the Strickland test. An examination of the factors cited by the State, however, shows 
that the State has failed to accurately identify and address the issue at stake. The State 
describes trial counsel's strategy as one where "the mental state of the offense was 
immaterial." Br. Appellee at 19. In other words, "defendant did not admit the conduct 
(inducing Lyon to inform falsely), but deny the mental state (knowingly); he denied the 
conduct. The mental state was therefore immaterial." Id, The States reasoning is faulty, 
however, based on the position described by Appellant's testimony and those testifying on his 
behalf. 
The position of Appellant through trial and this appeal is that while he did ask Airman 
Lyons to provide a statement (the actus red), he did not knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly 
ask Lyons to provide a false statement (the mens red). It is this intent that is the focal point of 
the Appellant's case. As such, it was incumbent on trial counsel to establish the mental state of 
Appellant in asking Airman Lyons to provide the statement. When Airman Lyons testified that 
the statement was false, trial counsel attempted to discredit Airman Lyons' statements to this 
effect as a way to establish Appellant's state of mind. This was done because the very issue 
was not only whether the statement was false, but also did Appellant know it was false. Yet, 
even with the apparent trial strategy of trial counsel to establish that Appellant did not know 
the statement was false, because in fact he believed it to be true, counsel failed to object to a 
set of jury instructions which failed to properly instruct the jury as to the mens rea element 
required for conviction of the charged offenses. Where trial counsel apparently developed a 
trial strategy intended to establish that Appellant's actions lacked the level of culpability to 
sustain a conviction, only to fail to ensure that the jury was properly instructed as to the 
necessary culpability, trial counsel's performance fell below the "standard of reasonable 
professional assistance . . . under all attendant circumstances." State v. Parker, 4 P.3d 778, 
781-82 (citations omitted). In essence, trial counsel's failure to object to the proposed jury 
instructions made it impossible for the jury to reach a competent decision and manifest error 
resulted. Thus, with regard to the jury instructions, Appellant's claims of ineffective 
assistance are not, as the State has suggested, subsumed by his claim of manifest injustice 
through the jury instructions. Rather, counsel's ineffective representation resulted in a 
situation where the improper jury instructions could only be cured through a showing of 
manifest, rather than plain, error, exacerbating an already prejudicial situation for Appellant. 
Thus, trial counsel's complicity in presenting the jury with inaccurate and incomplete jury 
instructions meets both prongs of the Strickland test, establishing the fact that Appellant was 
denied his right to a fair trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests this Court reverse the 
convictions of the lower court and remand for a new trial. 
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